 |
|
Journal
of Financial Planning - March 2007
"The Treasury, faced with an onslaught of tax-avoidance
schemes using transparently phony life insurance valuations, has fired
back with this new valuation recipe."
A New Recipe for Life Insurance Valuation
by
Peter Katt, CFP, LIC
In August 2005 the Treasury issued
final regulations under Internal Revenue Code Section 402(a) that define
how to value a life insurance policy when it is distributed from a qualified
retirement plan. Correctly applying these regulations provides taxpayers
with a safe-harbor value that will be acceptable to the Internal Revenue
Service (though I contend later in this column that the regulations often
are too harsh). It is reasonable to postulate that these regulations can
be used for all life insurance valuations involving tax issues and receive
the same safe-harbor treatment. Taxpayers are not required to use
these regulations in a valuation situation, but alternative valuations
could be challenged by the IRS, which could result in tax deficiencies
and other possible penalties, especially when associated with a qualified
retirement plan.
Permanent life insurance can be very complicated and has often been the
asset du jour in various tax-avoidance schemes, including abusive 412(i)
qualified retirement plans and so-called welfare benefit plans. Slick
tax-avoidance plan developers and enabling tax professionals spread the
notion that the 402(a) regs have changed the rules in the middle of their
game. Many claim that 412(i)s funded with springing cash value policies
and so-called pension rescue life insurance purchases were completely
legitimate until these regulations came along and then wham, an
out-of-control Treasury put an end to their creative use of these loopholes!
Au contraire: the IRS has never accepted the notion that an asset
can be worth X when used for tax measurement purposes and then have its
value go up at vast multiples of what that market would otherwise return.
For example, a 412(i) plan I reviewed several years ago claimed that $310,000
was the appropriate value for a life insurance policy when distributed
from the 412(i) and five years later would be worth $1,585,014, which
is a 39 percent compound return (see Life
Insurance Perspectives Vol. 5, No. 2, March 2003, especially the embedded
redacted report).
Regardless of claims made by the sellers of tax-avoidance schemes and
the new regulations, the truest measure of a life insurance policy should
be its fair market value, defined as a price that willing buyers
and sellers, having similar information, will agree upon. Certainly no
reasonable person would conclude that an asset that will be worth $1,585,014
in five years has a $310,000 value today. Only cunning tax-avoidance developers
(in cooperation with several life insurance companies) and tax-professional
defenders made such assertions. No doubt it was the perpetrators of such
blatant tax cheating that forced the Treasury to craft the strict standards
within these regs.
Punitive Valuations
The problem is that valuations performed under the
safe harbor of these regulations are quite punitive and in many instances,
in my opinion, do not reflect a policy's fair market value. Valuations
under these regs are determined with reference to a policy's accumulation
or account value, which is generally the premium payment less policy charges
plus interest. This account value is reduced by a surrender value factor
that has a significant limitation in establishing its safe-harbor value.
A recent valuation my firm did for a pension distribution had a safe-harbor
value of $265,208, while we calculated that its market value would be
$172,605. The difference is due to how most life insurance policies camouflage
their first-year selling expenses. Many policies use an account value
that is determined without regard to the true first-year selling expenses,
probably to hide from buyers how large the commissions are. This account
value is subject to a large surrender charge with the difference between
them being a policy's cash surrender value. The account value dramatically
overstates a policy's intrinsic value but these new regs severely limit
factoring in the interplay of surrender charges, and this is why they
often overstate a policy's market value.
Establishing a Policy's Market Value
To establish a policy's market value, we first calculate
its asset share, which tracks monies into and out of the policy to the
date of valuation. We determine whether the insured's health is about
the same as when the policy was acquired and other factors that could
affect a policy's value, such as the financial strength of the insurance
company. None of these factors are used in the regs for determining the
safe-harbor value. If no adjustments to the asset share are needed, we
test how this policy will perform in the future based on appropriate mortality
and expenses, and interest crediting that is compared with an in-force
illustration for the policy. If no quirks are noted, we can conclude that
the asset share is the policy's market value. This is the amount we would
advise a seller or buyer to settle on.
If an insured's health has deteriorated more than the passage of time
would expect, the insurance company has dismal financial strength, or
some other pertinent issue is evident, this will have a direct impact
on our determination of the policy's market value. Significantly, the
new regulations don't take into account the insured's health or other
factors. This can mean that the safe-harbor valuation will be lower, and
sometimes much lower than what we would consider the more accurate market
value.
We explicitly advise clients that the value determined under the IRS regulations
will be accepted by the IRS without question, while our market value could
be challenged and may need to be defended. The decision to use one or
the other will depend on the amount of the valuation difference, for what
purpose it will be used, and how willing the client is to fight if necessary.
The Treasury, faced with an onslaught of tax-avoidance schemes using transparently
phony life insurance valuations, has fired back with this new valuation
recipe. These valuations often produce a significant penalty because of
life insurance companies' fondness for hiding how large their first-year
expenses are. A legitimate market value may be sustainable but could be
challenged by the IRS with the outcome yet to be determined.
Reprinted
with permission by the Financial Planning Association, Journal of Financial
Planning, Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2007.
Peter
Katt, CFP, LIC, sole proprietor of Katt & Co., is a fee-only life
insurance adviser located in Kalamazoo, Michigan (269.372.3497).
|
|
|
 |